This paper investigates the determinants and competitive effects of legacy carriers' vertical integration decision with independent regional airlines. Legacy carriers allocate a larger share of their operations to an independent regional airline partner compared to their own fleet or a wholly owned regional airline on routes experiencing stronger competition. Moreover, legacy carriers' airfares are lower on routes operated more prominently by an independent regional airline. The results suggest that increased route competition is a motivation for the growing use of independent regional airlines by legacy carriers.
1 Introduction Spengler (1950) provides a seminal paper on antitrust issues associated with vertical integration, arguing that this strategic behavior could intensify competition. More recently, de Fontenay and Gans (2005) theorize that upstream competition incentivizes firms to vertically integrate in order to lower prices. Empirical papers on the market for electricity (Mansur, 2007) and ready-mixed concrete (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2007) find that vertical integration indeed leads to lower prices.
This paper provides an additional empirical example of the pro-competitive effects of vertical integration on prices.
In the airline industry, legacy carriers have recently become more reliant on independent regional airlines to provide service for passengers within their route network. Under these vertical integration arrangements, planes are owned by the regional airlines, but are painted to resemble the legacy carrier's fleet. Flight crews are employed by the regional airline, yet the legacy carrier is responsible for ticketing and operations at the airport. This paper uses a reduced-form regression model to assess the competitive effect of the vertical integration agreements between legacy carriers and their regional airline partners. One way this paper addresses this issue is by investigating the circumstances under which a legacy carrier decides to have a route served by an independent regional airline instead of its own fleet or a wholly owned regional airline. The regression results suggest that legacy carriers tend to allocate the operation of more competitive routes to an independent regional airline. Second, I analyze the legacy carriers' pricing behavior associated with this vertical integration decision. On this note, I find that legacy carriers set a lower average airfare, 10th percentile airfare, and 90th percentile airfare on routes operated by an independent regional airline.
The papers most closely related to this paper are Forbes and Lederman (2009) and Forbes and Lederman (2010) , which both analyze the legacy carriers decision to use either an independent regional airline or a wholly owned regional airline. First, Forbes and Lederman (2009) find that legacy carriers are more likely to operate with a wholly owned regional airline on routes that are more integrated with the legacy carrier's route network and are more susceptible to adverse weather conditions. Moreover, Forbes and Lederman (2010) find that service quality, as measured by on-time performance and cancellations, improve when using a wholly owned regional airline as opposed to an independent regional airline. This paper differentiates from the work done by Forbes and Lederman by providing an alternative reason why legacy carriers would want to vertically integrate with regional airlines. In particular, I focus on how upstream competition between legacy carriers and rival airlines, particularly low-cost carriers, influence the relationship between legacy carriers and independent regional airlines, which contrasts from the service quality motivations in the existing literature. As such, this paper complements the findings in the existing literature on the relationship between legacy carriers and regional airlines.
Data
The dataset used in this paper is primarily derived from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is published quarterly by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. It is a ten percent survey of domestic air travel and contains data on the origin, destination, non-stop distance between endpoints, ticketing and operating carrier, 1 market fare, 2 and number of passengers paying a particular market fare. Dates when legacy carriers were protected under Chapter 11 bankruptcy are obtained from public sources. Annual population and per capita income at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level are provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Finally, annual reports published by the Regional Airlines Association, an industry trade group, lists 1 The key distinction between the ticketing carrier and the operating carrier is that the ticketing carrier is the airline that the passenger purchased the ticket from, whereas the operating carrier is the airline that is in charge of the aircrew and fleet used on the flight.
2 Market fare is calculated by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics as the itinerary yield multiplied by the number of miles flown. Ancillary fees, such as baggage fees, priority seating fees, and the cost of food and beverage purchased on the flight, are not accounted for in the market fare.
the partnerships between legacy carriers and independent regional airlines and are summarized in Table 1 . 3 The sample time period for this paper is 1998 to 2015. Since this paper focuses on the legacy carriers' vertical integration decision with their independent regional airline partners, wholly owned regional airlines are not reported in Table 1. The following steps are undertaken to clean the data. First, I eliminate observations where the distance is equal to zero or the ticketing carrier is unidentified. Observations pertaining to a one-way market fare that is either less than $50 or greater than $1,000 are also dropped. Only observations related to coach fares on nonstop flights are kept. 4 I then limit the sample to routes within the contiguous United States with a maximum distance of 1,500 miles since regional airlines would not be used on longer routes and restrict the sample to the 2,500 routes with the highest number of passengers from 1998 to 2015. An observation in the resulting dataset is at the carrierroute-year-quarter level.
Legacy carriers have become more attracted to partnering with regional airlines in part because regional airlines benefit from relatively lower costs. For example, Hirsch (2007) found that senior pilots and flight attendants at United Airlines make 80 percent more and 32 percent more, respectively, than their counterparts at regional airlines. Moreover, Brueckner and Pai (2009) analyze how regional airlines have steadily replaced their turboprop aircraft with more cost efficient regional jets, leading to lower operating costs. As a result, the use of regional airlines by legacy carriers has drastically expanded over time as the total number of routes that legacy carriers operated using independent regional airlines increased from 210 in 1998 to 1,561 in 2009.
Since regional airlines have a more efficient cost structure, then perhaps legacy carriers could consider operating all routes using their regional airline partners. However, scope clauses in labor union contracts between legacy carriers and their labor unions limit the amount of routes that the legacy carrier can operate using a regional airline. As discussed in both Forbes and Lederman (2007) and Rupp and Liu (2016) , scope clauses typically take on one of two forms: 1) a cap on the total number of operated by a regional airline on behalf of a legacy carrier or 2) the legacy carrier must increase the amount of flights used by its own fleet by a pre-determined ratio for every increase in routes operated by regional airlines. These scope clauses effectively create a trade-off for the legacy carrier when they decide which routes to allocate to its own fleet or to an independent regional airline partner. Interestingly, recent labor negotiations between legacy carriers and their labor unions have allowed legacy carriers to increase the amount of routes that can be outsourced to independent regional airlines. The number of passengers is calculated based on whether the operating carrier was an independent regional airline, low-cost carrier, or legacy carrier. As such, the number of passengers is not determined by the ticketing carrier. For example, independent regional airlines would be credited for the number of passengers it flew on behalf of a legacy carrier. Legacy carriers only get credit for passengers who flew on flights that they operated using their own fleet or a wholly owned regional airline. Figure 1 shows strong growth by independent regional airlines based on the data sample used in this paper. In fact, 208 million and 1.6 million passengers flew on flights operated by legacy carriers and independent regional airlines, respectively, in 1998. This corresponds to a market share of 77.6% for legacy carriers and 0.6% for independent regional airlines. While the number of passengers flown by legacy carriers decreased to 158 million passengers (45.8% market share) in 2015, 25.3 million passengers (7.3% market share) flew with an independent regional airline operating on behalf of a legacy carrier. Since scope clauses have become less constrained over time, legacy carriers have been able to outsource more flights to regional airlines, which helps explain the growth of regional airlines as illustrated in Figure 1 .
As with regional airlines, low-cost carriers have experienced a remarkable growth in the number of passengers flown between 1998 and 2015. 5 Figure 1 illustrates that the number of passengers flown by low-cost carriers has increased dramatically from 58.3 million (21.7% market share) in 1998 to 162 million (46.9% market share) in 2015. This paper studies how increased route competition, particularly from low-cost carriers, has impacted the growing use of independent regional airlines by legacy carriers.
Empirical Analysis
Legacy carriers could potentially charge lower prices by exploiting a regional airlines' more efficient cost structure. However, the legacy carrier's pricing strategy could be endogenous with its vertical integration decision to operate a route using its own fleet or outsourcing to an independent regional airline. In order to resolve these inherent endogeneity issues, I implement a two stage regression model that takes advantage of the fact that the legacy carriers' capacity decision is based on lagged factors that also affect their pricing behavior.
The regression specification is as follows:
(1)
Equation 1 refers to the first stage regression of REGshare i jt , the proportion of total route passengers ticketed through legacy carrier i that flew with an independent regional airline on route j in time t, on lagged measures of route competition (competition j,t−4 ), other lagged control variables (X i j,t−4 ), and year-quarter dummy variables (γ t ). Since REGshare i jt is a continuous variable bounded between zero and one, Equation (1) is estimated using a two-sided Tobit regression. On the other hand, Equation (2) refers to the second stage regression of lnPrice i j,t , the logged average one-way airfare set by legacy carrier i for route j in time t, on fitted values of REGshare i j,t , contemporaneous measures of route competition (competition j,t ), other contemporaneous control variables (X i j,t ), as well as carrier-route fixed effects (η i j ) and year-quarter fixed effects (η t ). 6 Standard errors are clustered by carrier-route in both stages to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation between a carrier-route combination.
It is important to note that factors that influence REGshare, such as competition, can also impact lnPrice and are included in both stages of the regression specification. Based on conversations with industry contacts, the legacy carriers' vertical integration decision is made well in advance of the current time period. As such, the control variables in the first stage (Equation (1)) are lagged by four quarters to account for capacity decisions being made a year beforehand. Moreover, industry contacts claim that price is not a factor for a legacy carrier when the airline determines whether to operate a route itself or using an independent regional airline partner, which mitigates concerns that lnPrice should be included as a control variable in the first stage. Consistent with the papers in the existing literature, the fixed effects pricing regression (Equation (2)) includes contemporaneous values of the control variables.
In order to assuage any endogeneity concerns regarding competition and airfares, I follow the empirical strategy in Kwoka, Hearle, and Alepin (2016) by including three different measures of competition in the regressions: 1) the route-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 2) the routelevel market share for low-cost carriers (LCCshare), and 3) the number of legacy carriers (nLEG) and low-cost carriers (nLCC) servicing a route. Neither Kwoka, Hearle, and Alepin (2016) nor Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2013) implement instruments for competition, arguing that potential endogeneity would lead to upward bias that would work against the typical relationship between competition and airfares. Instead, qualitatively similar regression results suggesting a negative correlation between airfares and different measures of competition alleviate the concern that any possible bias discredit the empirical findings.
The regression specification includes other control variables (X) commonly used in the existing literature. First, market density is proxied using the number of passengers at the origin airport (OriginPax) and destination airport (DestinationPax). Second, the geometric mean of the popu- Table 3 provides the main results of this paper, pooling observations for all six legacy carriers.
The marginal effects based on the Tobit regression estimates are reported on the left hand side of the table, whereas the fixed effects regression coefficients are presented on the right hand side of the table. The number of observations used in the regression (165,734) is less than the total number of observations in the data set (190, 711) due to the four quarter lag structure in Equation
(1). The results from the first stage Tobit regression suggest that legacy carriers are more likely to use regional airlines on thin routes in smaller markets with higher levels of per capita income.
The results in Table 3 suggest that stronger route competition is positively correlated with
REGshare. Since larger values of HHI corresponds to weaker competition, an increase in HHI (−0.039) is associated with a negative and statistically significant effect on the usage of regional airlines. The sign for HHI should be opposite the signs for the alternative measures for competition. Indeed, the marginal effect for LCCshare is 0.033, suggesting that a 1% increase in the market share of a low-cost carrier on a route increases REGshare by 3.3%. Similarly, the marginal effect for nLEG and nLCC are both positive and statistically significant. Therefore, legacy carriers are more likely to allocate independent regional airlines on routes where the legacy carrier experiences stronger competition, particularly from low-cost carriers. The second stage results in Table 3 analyzes the pro-competitive effect of vertical integration on the legacy carriers' pricing strategy. Consistent with the findings in the existing literature, an increase in competition is associated with lower average airfares with a positive and significant estimated coefficient for HHI (0.213) and a negative and significant estimated coefficient for LCCshare (-0.315), nLEG (-0.008), and nLCC (-0.129). More importantly, the estimated coefficient for REGshare is negative and statistically significant regardless of the measure for route competition. Thus, one of the key findings of this paper is that legacy carriers tend to offer lower prices on routes operated by a higher proportion of independent regional airlines.
Forbes and Lederman (2009) find that the legacy carriers' vertical integration decision is mo-
tivated by service quality concerns, whereas Forbes and Lederman (2010) find that vertical integration improves airline performance, as measured by flight delays and cancellations. The results
in Table 3 complement their findings by suggesting an alternative motivation behind this vertical integration decision. Namely, legacy carriers are more inclined to use independent regional airlines on more competitive routes, which allows them to charge a lower price. 7
Industrial organization economists have been interested in Southwest Airlines as a case study on the effect of low-cost carriers in the airline industry. Both Morrison (2001) and Vowles (2001) analyze the "Southwest Effect," in which entry by Southwest Airlines leads to not only a decrease in the incumbents' airfares but also an increase in the number of passengers flying on that route.
More recent research has focused on comparing the effect of Southwest Airlines with other lowcost carriers. Kwoka, Hearle, and Alepin (2016) finds that the presence of a low-cost carrier on a route puts downward pressure on airfares with Southwest having the largest single effect on pricing. Moreover, Bruckner, Lee, and Singer (2013) shows that adjacent competition with low-7 I estimate the regression specification separately for each legacy carrier in order to construct a Chow-like F-test for both the first stage regression and the second stage regression. Although I reject the null hypothesis that the estimated parameters are the same between all individual airlines, the marginal effects for competition on REGshare suggest that each legacy carrier is more inclined to use its regional airline partners on more competitive routes and the regression estimates for REGshare on price suggest that each legacy carrier lowers their average price for routes with a higher share of regional airlines. In other words, the regression results are not quantitatively similar, but they are qualitatively similar. As a result, I present the regression results pooling the six legacy carriers together throughout this paper. cost carriers significantly reduces airfares with Southwest again having a particularly strong effect.
Consequently, it could be the case that the main results from Table 3 are largely influenced by Southwest Airlines. . Year-quarter fixed effects in both Equations 1 and 2 and carrier-route fixed effects in Equation 2 are suppressed. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by carrier-route to account for correlation between a carrier-route combination over time. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
In order to check that legacy carriers respond to competition from Southwest Airlines and other low-cost carriers in a similar fashion, I replace the route-level market share for low-cost carriers (LCCshare) in both Equations (1) and (2) with the route-level market share for Southwest Airlines (W Nshare) and the route-level market share for other low-cost carriers (OtherLCCshare), as well as replacing the number of low-cost carriers servicing a route (nLCC) with an indicator variable for the presence of Southwest Airlines on a route (W N) and the number of other low-cost carriers on the route (nOtherLCC). 8 Table 4 presents the regression results.
Although the marginal effect for OtherLCCshare (-0.031) in the first stage is negative and statistically significant in Column (1) of Table 4 , the marginal effect for W Nshare (0.084) is positive and statistically significant. This suggests the legacy carriers increase their usage of an independent regional airline partner on routes serviced by Southwest Airlines, but not when competing against other low-cost carriers. Moreover, the second stage regression results in Column (1) of Table 4 are qualitatively similar with those in Column (2) of Table 3 , implying that legacy carriers' average airfares are lower not only for routes where low-cost carriers have a larger market share but also when they use an independent regional airline partner.
The results in Column (2) of Table 4 Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) find that increased competition puts stronger downward pressure on 90th percentile airfares than on 10th percentile airfares. I study the effect of REGshare on different portions of the price distribution by replacing lnPrice in Equation (2) with logged 10th percentile airfare (lnP10) and logged 90th percentile airfare (lnP90). Tables 5 and 6 presents the regression results using 10th percentile airfares and 90th percentile airfares as the dependent variable in the second stage, respectively. Unsurprisingly, the first stage regression results in Tables 3, 5, and 6 are exactly the same regardless of the dependent variable used in the second stage.
8 WN is the International Air Transport Association code for Southwest Airlines. The results in Tables 5 and 6 show that the impact of REGshare on pricing is strongest for 90th percentile airfares and weakest for 10th percentile airfares. For example, the estimated coefficient for REGshare in Column (1) for the second stage results in Table 3 is -0.209, which is in between the coefficient in Column (1) in both Table 5 (-0.166) and in Table 6 (-0.239). A similar pattern exists for REGshare when using either LCCshare (Column (2)) or the combination of nLEG and nLCC (Column (3)) as the competition variable. This suggests that the effect of a larger share of regional airlines operating a route on behalf of a legacy carrier is stronger for the most expensive fares compared to the cheapest fares. 
Conclusion
This paper investigates the determinants and effects of legacy carriers' decision to vertically integrate with their independent regional airline partners. I find that legacy carriers increase their usage of an independent regional airline on routes experiencing stronger competition, particularly from low-cost carriers. Moreover, the results suggest that this partnership is associated with lower airfares along the legacy carriers' price distribution. Therefore, I conclude that the growth of regional airlines in the U.S. airline industry stems from a pro-competitive response from legacy carriers.
Although regional airlines provide a more cost-efficient alternative to operating a route themselves, legacy carriers are unable to use regional airlines on all routes. First, regional airlines use smaller aircraft that can only carry between 50-100 passengers and are limited by a maximum range of 1,500 miles. As such, legacy carriers would not want to use regional airlines if the distance is too far or if the demand for a particular route is too high. In these cases, it would be more profitable for a legacy carrier to operate the route with their own fleet and aircrew. Moreover, scope clauses in labor agreements with legacy carriers limits the number of routes that can be outsourced to regional airlines although these restrictions have been relaxed in recent labor negotiations. Despite these limitations, regional airlines serve as a means for legacy carriers to better compete with competitors on certain routes.
Industrial organization economists have long been interested in pricing phenomenons, particularly in the U.S. airline industry. Previous papers have found evidence that airlines charge higher prices at their hub airport 9 and that competition affects the ability for airlines to price discriminate. 10 This paper analyzes a different mechanism for price competition between airlines by investigating how vertical integration in the airline industry allows legacy carriers to set a lower price in order to better compete with rival airlines.
